C ultural norms of behaviour influence desirable and problematic behaviours of individuals. In particular, cultural norms should influence individuals' dishonesty. In a recent Nature study, prevalence of rule violations was introduced as a new country-level measure of behavioural norms. However, information on individuals' actual honesty was not available due to characteristics of the experimental design. Overcoming this limitation, we show that country-level behavioural norms are related to individual-level knowledge overclaiming behaviour (i.e., claiming to know concepts that do not exist, a measure of individuals' actual behavioural dishonesty) among 290,954 students from 57 countries (from the 2012 PISA study). Our study represents a crucial test of the argument that cultural norms influence individual's behaviour and of the validity of the measurement of countries' prevalences of rule violations. These results imply that shaping the behaviour of today's students may result in new behavioural norms that emphasise honesty and rule adherence more strongly.
If individuals commonly observe that rules can be bent or violated to reach goals (e.g., Crittenden, Hanna, & Peterson, 2009; Hanna, Crittenden, & Crittenden, 2013) , they will likely adapt their behaviour accordingly and become similar models for others (Bandura, 1965; Corbacho, Gingerich, Oliveros, & Ruiz-Vega, 2016; Hortobagyi, 2014; Lawson, 2004) . Social learning can make people engage in desirable (e.g., saving water) as well as problematic behaviours (e.g., cheating in school). In this realm, social learning helps us to understand cross-cultural differences, because different countries can stand for different behavioural practices (i.e., descriptive norms; Frese, 2015) , and these norm differences could have important consequences for understanding cross-cultural differences in behaviour. Gächter and Schulz (2016) recently argued that there are meaningful differences between countries in how much the respective population tolerates the violation of rules. According to them, a higher shadow economy, greater lack of democratic qualities in politics, and greater Correspondence should be addressed to Clemens B. Fell, Fachrichtung Psychologie, Universität des Saarlandes, Campus A 1 3, 66123 Saarbrücken, Germany. (E-mail: c.fell@mx.uni-saarland.de).
We thank Michael Schilling for helpful literature hints, an active community of other R users for sharing their expertise, and Johannes Schult for sharing his knowledge about OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment. C.B.F. and C.J.K. planned the study with the help of S.J. and D.S. C.B.F., S.J., and D.S. conducted preliminary data analysis. C.B.F. conducted the main data analyses under the supervision of M.Z. and C.J.K. Benefitting from the feedback of S.J. and D.S. and the help of M.Z., C.B.F. and C.J.K. co-wrote the paper. lack of control of corruption are more prevalent in some countries and less prevalent in others, which they summarise as the prevalence of rule violations. Gächter and Schulz also showed that such cross-cultural differences in the prevalence of rule violations are related to dishonesty of individuals in these countries. In the underlying experiment, participants from 23 countries were asked to sit in an unobservable cubicle and to roll a die. Then participants had to report the outcome, which then determined the monetary prize they received. Participants knew about their anonymity (i.e., that the experimenter could not verify whether they reported the correct number). Based on probability theory, the number of people getting a certain number on the die could be determined and thereby the difference to the number of people actually reporting the number and thereby claiming more money. However, this was also a major shortcoming of the study, as it prevented Gächter and Schulz from examining actual individual dishonesty-they could only analyse aggregated data. To get at the core of the argument that cultural norms of dishonesty influence individual's dishonesty behaviour, one needs to measure individual dishonesty without requiring special precautions to assure participants of their anonymity. A technique developed for such purposes is knowledge overclaiming. A knowledge-overclaiming individual claims to know a concept that does not actually exist (Atir, Rosenzweig, & Dunning, 2015; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003) . For example, students participating in the PISA study in 2012 (OECD, 2014) were asked to indicate their familiarity with 16 mathematical concepts, three of which did not exist (which are called foils). Tests using this technique of embedding foils in items that do exist (reals) have been developed for several areas including vocabulary (e.g., Ziegler, Kemper, & Rammstedt, 2013) . In personnel selection, the expression "bogus items" is more common (e.g., Levashina, Morgeson, & Campion, 2009 ), but seems to apply more to job-specific measures and to small number of foils (Bing, Kluemper, Kristl Davison, Taylor, & Novicevic, 2011) . There is already considerable evidence showing the relation between overclaiming and other indicators of dishonesty (e.g., Bing et al., 2011; Kemper & Menold, 2014) . Consequently, the overclaiming technique was considered as appropriate to investigate the relationship between dishonesty and cultural norms on an individual level without compromising anonymity.
The aim of this study was therefore to directly examine the association between cultural honesty norms and individuals' behavioural honesty by combining two data sets. One data set is the PISA study that includes knowledge-overclaiming behaviour of nearly 300,000 adolescents (available from PISA 2012; OECD, 2014); the other data set is the Gächter and Schulz (2016) measure of countries' prevalence of rule violations.
METHOD
All analyses were conducted using R 3.2.1 with additional packages. Details about the packages are available on request from the first author.
Sample
As our study is based on two primary large-scale studies (Gächter & Schulz, 2016; OECD, 2014) , our sample comprises N = 290,954 individuals from 57 countries (Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, USA, Vietnam). The final sample represents all complete cases in terms of individual knowledge overclaiming, country prevalence of rule violations and individual control variables.
Variables

Individual knowledge overclaiming
Data on overclaiming (the individual-level criterion) were taken from PISA 2012 (OECD, 2014, pp. 52-53, 329) ; data were available for students from all countries apart from Norway. Considering it as a test of their mathematical knowledge, students were asked to indicate their familiarity with 16 mathematical concepts (e.g., exponential function) on a scale from 1 (never heard of it) to 5 (know it well). Participants were, however, unaware that three concepts ("proper number," "subjunctive scaling," "declarative fraction") did not actually exist (i.e., three 'foils' were integrated). Individual overclaiming was operationalised as average foil familiarity score (Atir et al., 2015) , with higher scores representing greater individual overclaiming (range = [1.00-5.00], M = 2.32, SD = 1.03). Due to PISA's rotated survey design (OECD, 2014), 66% of the students in PISA's student questionnaire data file (http://pisa2012.acer.edu .au/downloads/INT_STU12_DEC03.zip) encountered these 16 familiarity items. We excluded students who had either more than 30% missings among foils or the real mathematical concepts (i.e., 5% of the participants).
Country prevalence of rule violations
Data were taken from Gächter and Schulz (2016) (http://datadryad.org/resource/doi:10.5061/dryad .9k358); data were available for countries of PISA 2012 (Shalvi, 2016) .
Individual control variables: gender, age and economic, social and cultural status
To prevent possible confounding effects, we controlled for students' gender (51% female, 49% male), age (i.e., 2012-year of birth, 93% 16-year-olds, 7% 15-year-olds; OECD, 2013, p. 63) and economic, social and cultural status (OECD, 2014, pp. 351-354 ; higher scores represent a higher status, range = [−5.95-3.69], M = −0.24, SD = 1.13). Data were taken from PISA 2012 (OECD, 2014) and were available for 98% of the students in PISA's student questionnaire data file (http://pisa2012 .acer.edu.au/downloads/INT_STU12_DEC03.zip); complete cases in terms of control variables came from all countries except for Albania.
RESULTS
Country-level intercorrelations of the study variables (Table 1, Figure 1 ) are in line with the idea that knowledge overclaiming is fostered by countries' behavioural practices of rule violations. As the data of individuals are nested in countries in our data, multilevel regression analysis is more appropriate than correlation analyses (Hox, 2010) . The results of multilevel regression analyses are shown in Table 2 . Model 1 revealed that 13% of the variance in individual knowledge overclaiming was explained by country level. The multilevel regression model that includes country-level prevalences of rule violations (Model 3 in Table 2 ) explains individual knowledge overclaiming significantly better (cf. Model comparisons in Table 2 ) than the model with individual-level control predictors only (Model 2 in Table 2 Table 2 ) after stepwise inspection of random effects (Models 4.1-4.3 in Table 2 ), we also revealed a significant moderation of the association between prevalences of rule violations and knowledge overclaiming by gender (Model 5.1 in Table 2 , Figure 2 ).
DISCUSSION
Our findings confirm the idea that behavioural practices guide individuals' behaviour (Frese, 2015) . If rules are violated in a society on a regular basis, adolescents will engage more strongly in overclaiming their knowledge. Additionally, we validated Gächter and Schulz's (2016) indicator of societal dishonesty, overcoming the limitation of not examining individuals' actual behavioural honesty (Atir et al., 2015; Bing et al., 2011) .
Furthermore, we unexpectedly found evidence suggesting that gender and cross-cultural norms interact. Our results show that females seem to overclaim slightly less than males (which is consistent with the results by Ziegler et al., 2013) , but this gender difference disappears when the cross-cultural norms suggest that rule violations are tolerated. This implies that stronger cultural norms of rule violations might level out gender differences. However, it remains to be tested whether this can be replicated.
If a replication is attempted, such a new study should also try to incorporate a richer set of predictor variables on the individual level (because it was only possible to control for gender, age, as well as economic, social and cultural status). In particular, personality traits and attitudes have been linked to dishonesty-for example, some people are particularly convinced that the social 20 FELL ET AL. Table 2 ).
world is a jungle in which everybody has to compete over scarce resources, and such an attitude is likely related to engaging in dishonest behaviour (i.e., if they hold competitive worldviews; cf. Roulin, Krings, & Binggeli, 2016) . In addition, such a future project should try to measure dishonesty in different ways because knowledge overclaiming does likely only capture a facet of dishonesty (see, e.g., Ludeke and Makransky, 2016 , for a critical view on overclaiming).
Our findings have important implications. As shown, even for adolescents, there seems to be an association between individual behaviour and their cultures' behavioural practices in terms of rule violations. There is thus reason to believe that today's adolescents will become similar role models for future generations (Javidan, 2013 ). In the case of corruption, for example, vicious circles have been reported in terms of today's consequences becoming tomorrow's antecedents (Pingle, 2012) , which might be one of the reasons why there have been so few successful attempts to fight corruption (Svensson, 2005) . According to our study, changing the behaviour of today's adolescents might be a promising opportunity to successfully fight rule violations such as corruption (Lawson, 2004) .
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